This paper summarizes and presents the arguments on behalf of
defendant-appellant Robert Boyle (Defendant) in the appeal of the ruling of the trial court in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the testimony of the State's witness concerning her use of a specially trained canine to detect accelerants used in arson.
The district court erred in ruling that Hawkeye Rules of Evidence superseded the State's general acceptance standard for the admissibility of allegedly scientific expert testimony under the rationale and "general observations" of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not binding on the courts of the State of Hawkeye which are free to adopt their own rules of evidence and interpretations thereof. The standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in Steffens v. Lease, 284 Hawk. 302, 305 (1989) should remain the evidentiary law in Hawkeye because under it the judicial process is better protected against the introduction of bogus or unreliable evidence than would be the case if the Daubert interpretation were to govern the admission of such evidence in Hawkeye. In ruling as it did on Defendant's motion to suppress, the district court exceeded its powers. Defendant's rights were materially prejudiced by the district court's ruling because the admission of the evidence of the canine trainer as opposed to its exclusion adversely affected the outcome of the case at trial.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE SET FORTH IN DAUBERT WAS APPLICABLE IN HAWKEYE BECAUSE SUCH A FEDERAL RULING IS NEITHER NECESSARY, DESIRABLE OR WITHIN THE POWERS OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
The Supreme Court in Daubert affirmed a decision by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that expert testimony concerning the allegedly adverse effects of the...