of the Cold War as well as [he] did" would seem to credit him with something over which he had no control.
Eisenhower continued the practice of containment of Communism that Truman established after World War II. Although Eisenhower believed the differences between Capitalism and Communism remained "an irreconcilable conflict," it was not the policy of his administration to aggressively attack Communist holdings (Ambrose 130). Rather, Eisenhower relied on the Soviet's knowledge of the United States' superior military capabilities to serve as a deterrent to aggression. As Ambrose states: "The key to the New Look was the American ability to build and deliver nuclear weapons. Put more bluntly, Eisenhower's military policy rested on America's capacity to destroy the Soviet Union" (131).
Thus, it may have been Eisenhower's policies that generate the implication that a Republican president can provide solutions without resorting to aggression. However, although he managed to keep American troops out of war during his administration, the public was generally unsatisfied with his failure to adequately contain or roll back Communism. It was probably a level of dissatisfaction that would be a political death today. Nonetheless, it establishes that Eisenhower made decisions regarding aggression based on deep personal beliefs about the need for aggression and military spending and the effects of both on the day-to-day domestic life of Americans rather than an overriding political ideology.
Kennedy probably offers the best evidence of a Democratic president reacting too aggressively in an attempt to establish the perception of strength. Although undoubtedly a threat, the Soviet missiles in Cuba did not substantially change the nature of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, Kennedy, a young President seeking perhaps to prove himself, may have reacted too strongly and generated an atmosp...