he plane. The errorresponse possibilities are many-fold, but can be classified as problems stemming from high technology and training, cockpit management, drugs, fatigue, crowded skies, carelessness and poor judgement.
As aviation safety experts seek ways to reduce pilot mistakes, they are focusing more and more on pilot training, on initial instruction as well as the retraining of experienced airline pilots. Meanwhile, the demand for airline pilots is projected to grow steadily as the air transport industry expands. The experience level of the typical airline pilot is thus expected to fall, even as new airlines become more complicated to fly. The usual source for pilots, the military, is drying up because the military has fewer pilots and are holding onto them longer (Stockton 40). While the demand for pilots is increasing and training issues become more important, questions are being raised about the design and "use of the high-tech autopilots and computerized flight-control systems that encourage pilots to become passive monitors who watch their airplane fly instead of active pilots who are masters of their craft" (Stockton 40). Just how many of the accidents in 1987 were a result of this automation complacency are not known, but the NTSB believes it resulted in the crash of the Northwest Airlines in Detroit in August, 1987, which killed 156 people. According to the evidence, it appears that the pilot forgot to set the wing flaps. A signal that would have warned them never went off and the crew didn't bother to look. Deploying the flaps is such an integral part of flying an airplane, that forgetting to do so is "akin to a driver neglecting to close the car door before racing down the expressway" (Stockton 60).
In other incidents, flight crews have entered the wrong data into the computer-navigation system with the results sometimes
...