AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE COLD WAR 1945 1950
Walter LaFeber's book consists of a comprehensive history
of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. This is a revisionist history of uneven
reliability. LaFeber often arranges his "facts" and uses
inadequate citations to support his biased conclusions. LaFeber
finds serious fault with the foreign policy leadership of both
superpowers. To him, the Cold War represented a senseless,
spiraling arms race and a waste of human and material resources
on a colossal scale. For the United States, "it has not been the
most satisfying chapter in American diplomatic history" (1) When
the Cold War was over, "no one could conclude . . . that the
world had become a safer place in which to live" (335).
The book begins with a grossly oversimplified treatment of
the origins of the Cold War. According to LaFeber, the World
War II partnership between the United States and the Soviet
Union was a "shot gun marriage forced upon them" (7) by Hitler
which "climaxed half a century of enmity" (6 7). That
partnership broke down after the war, allegedly because of an
American failure to reconcile contradictions in its policy
toward the Soviet Union. The United States had to choose between
good relations with the Soviet Union and conflict over Soviet
imposition of its system in Eastern Europe. American policy
toward Russia hardened under Truman, which, in LaFeber's view,
. . . stiffened Russian determination to control Poland" (17)
This statement flies in the face of Russian obstinacy on the
Polish issue throughout the war. LaFeber argues that Stalin's
priority was "not world revolution," but "Russian security and
In opposing Stalin's pressures on Iran and Turkey, the
United States failed to take into account that "Stalin probably
believed that . . . Russia had as much r...