heory, however, which "emphasize[s] people's ability, regardless of age or circumstances, to take charge of their own lives and foster their own development" by means of their innate "human capacities of choice, creativity, and self-realization" (443).
But it is also necessary to ask oneself why this particular approach exerts such appeal. As I mentioned, the humanistic perspective accounts for the seeming inability of disadvantaged people to take charge of their own lives and move beyond the difficulties that hold them back. If an individual is particularly bothered by these problems in American society then a theory that offers such an explanation of underdevelopment, and so much hope for overcoming it, is going to exert special appeal. Social programs that help disadvantaged persons achieve their basic needs are, of course, justified by this view of development--in fact, they are almost demanded by it. Yet, as Papalia, Olds and Feldman note, humanistic theories are far too generalized and subjective to offer very full explanations of the variety of patterns and events that occur across groups of people. Children in different economic and social groups, for example, may experience similar patterns of development regardless of whether basic needs are not met or appear, at least, to be met. But since humanistic theory is so generalized (rather than being generalizible) its "concepts are not clearly defined and so are hard to use as a basis for research" (443-44).
This does not mean, of course, that these ideas are valueless. The concept of self-actualization, for example, offers as full a description of how an individual feels about what s/he is trying to accomplish as can be found in, for instance, the more complete psychosocial theory of development offered by Erik Erikson. But the inevitable consequence of reading about development is that the reader attempts to apply the various explanations of steps in development t...