cial organization and commercial agriculture that are similarly not present across countries. He combines these elements of evidence to generalize comparatively across international borders about likelihood of types of political structures.
The possible combinations of factors in each country are very great, making analysis potentially complex. Thus when evidence runs against the theory, Moore must (1) explain the reason for the deviation from his ideas or (2) account for why his selection of cases may not answer all criticism. Chiefly, however, he takes the view that social-class behavior within a country is at least as changeable as changes in commercial agriculture, and far more important than any presumed "national" explanations of political or social change on the international scene.
This may give short shrift to statistics or other "unscientific" explanations of history, but the fact that social science is not the same as mathematics does not mean that Moore's analysis is not valid. It does mean that Moore recognizes that human behavior and social systems have repeatedly proven their random character and that they may be considered alongside statistics and statistical interpretation. The very exercise of comparison, accordingly, finds meaning in this behavior.
Moore characterizes the English case as one of a gradual buildup to a free, stable society, despite the fact that so many of England's free institutions were formed in a climate in which royal control was at issue and aristocratic alliances were such crucial determinants of claims to royal legitimacy. Yet Moore cites "England's relatively weak version of royal absolutism," which may be an aspect of the fact that the throne was so hotly contested until the latter 17th century. Side by side with that phenomenon was the fact that from the time of the transition from Plantagenet to Tudor through the Civil War, Restoration, and 1688 Glorious Revolution, "a mod...