certainly have altered. Joseph C. Grew, FDR's ambassador in Tokyo, wanted a softer line from Washington, But Hull and his senior advisors at the State Department were hard-liners, and they could be steely because Congress, including most of the isolationist bloc--was vehemently anti-Japanese (Prange 24).
The embargoed Japanese now believed that they had no choice. They had to go to war, unless they left China, which was unthinkable. They began sharpening their swords. American intelligence, in possession of the Japanese code, could follow almost every development. On November 22 a message from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura in Washington warned that "in a week, things are automatically going to happen." On November 27 the Signal Corps transcribed a conversation between Assistant Ambassador Kurusu in Washington and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in Tokyo. They were using a voice code in which "Miss Umeko" referred to Hull and "Miss Kimiko" meant President Roosevelt. The term "matrimon
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