The purpose of this research is to describe the philosophical contributions of Baruch (Benedict) de Spinoza, from the standpoint of a supporter of his views. Within the short space of this research, we cannot deal with the arguments against both his predecessors (such as Aristotle) or his contemporaries (such as Descartes) that he engaged in in much of his writing, the objections that can be (and have been) raised to the confusions and semantic difficulties in his philosophy (much of which is the result of his own endless lens-grinding refining), or the controversy among his commentators about the relative unity of his system. We will content ourselves with making the assumption that the overall system of ideas is somewhat unified. In this context, we will delineate the largest of the concepts as the major contributions, though many of the smaller psychological insights prepared the way for modern psychology.
Spinoza (1634-1677) is often categorized as a Cartesian, or as a latter-day Scholastic. He had something in common with both groups, but the differences are crucial. Spinoza, like the Cartesians, was reacting with reason to the climate of belief that existed in European thought of the 17th century, attempting to apply mathematics and the New Science to the philosophical problems formulated by the Greeks and the medieval thinkers.
Spinoza was Jewish, though he was excommunicated from the Synagogue for disbelieving in the orthodox position; his family, though nominally accepting Christianity, remained Jewish. He was conversant with the works of Moses Maimonides, and the Neo-Platonists, (which undoubtedly had an influence through the Plotinian doctrine of emanationism). Because of his double heresy (his family had come to Holland to escape the Spanish Inquisition), he was considered a great risk to befriend: even the illustrious Leibniz, who was a nobleman, lied about the extent of his friendship with Spinoza. He ...