s had broken the monopoly of the banks on cheap deposits, and many banks found that their best corporate customers were deserting them ("Coping with the Ups and Downs" 4). In the U.S., the government sought to prevent many banks from collapsing by in effect subsidizing their failures in the late 1980s. The reason for this was widespread fear that large bank failures would set off a domino effect and bring down other banks or even the macroeconomy. In addition, because the banks were considered special in that they provide money and credit to their communities, many feared that the failure of these banks would greatly reduce the availability of these services. Kaufman sees these fears as invalid, with no support either in history or theory (Kaufman 1). The trends that threatened banks beginning in the 1980s threatened other types of business as well, but banks had particular vulnerabilities for precisely the reason noted above--governments fear a backlash if a big bank should fail. One reason is the number of unhappy depos
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