eak. Euphemism, he explains, can be unambiguous if it is a device of tact that protects the feelings of others but is doublespeak (and perforce enters the discourse of metaphysics, though Lutz does not specifically say so) when it misleads or deceives:
[I]n 1984, the U.S. State Department announced that it would no longer use the word "killing" in its annual report on the status of human rights in countries around the world. Instead, it would use the phrase "unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of life," which the department claimed was more accurate. Its real purpose for using this phrase was simply to avoid discussing the embarrassing situation of government-sanctioned killings in countries that are supported by the United States. . . . This use of a euphemism . . . is designed to mislead, to cover up the unpleasant. Its real intent is at variance with its apparent intent. It is language designed to alter our perception of reality.
Lutz concedes that jargon can be useful as the "specialized language" of professions, trades, or enthusiasts but cautions that it can be ambiguous, or doublespeak, when it "makes the simple appear complex, the ordinary profound, the obvious insightful." An example of that is provided by Edwin Newman, who deplores the adoption of jargon by sociologists and psychologists: "Siblings are conflicted in their interpersonal relationships means that children of the same parent or parents don't like each other." Lutz shows that the implications of jargon usage can extend beyond the linguistic context. He cites a plane crash that killed three people and also yielded National Airlines an insurance claim of $1.7 million, yielding its stockholders an extra dividend of 18ยข per share. Lutz continues:
National Airlines . . . did not want to talk about one of its airplanes crashing, and it had to account for the $1.7 million when it issued its annual report to its stockholders. . . . [A] footnote in its annual rep...