this plan would deter Saddam from a further advance; if he did advance, it would--when fully deployed--provide a sufficient force to stop him. It would not provide a sufficient force to counterract and liberate Kuwait.
Plan 91-1002 was just being settled upon when, apparently on August 5, 1990, President Bush raised the stakes. (Woodward's book lacks a clear chronology.) Stepping from his helicopter in front of the White House, the president was as always surrounded by reporters, asking how he intended to respond to the invasion of Kuwait.
When he was pressed by the reporters, Bush snapped, "Just wait. Watch and learn."
Waving his finger, growing visibly hot, he said, "I view very seriously our determination to reverse out this aggression.... This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait."
According to Woodward, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) first became aware of this statement when he saw it on television, watching CNN.
"Uh-oh!" Powell said to himself. The President had
now clearly, categorically, set a new goal, not only to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia and defend Saudi Arabia
but to revers the invasion of Kuwait. Powell was
...