regarding Lee's decision to undertake an offensive strategy at Gettysburg. Following the first day of battle, Longstreet was in agreement with Lee that they had placed the Union troops at a disadvantage. Both men felt that it would be possible to severely weaken the North as a result of the battle. However, the two Southern leaders disagreed strongly on the way in which the operation should be carried out. In his memoirs entitled From Manassas to Appomattox (1896), Longstreet described how he encouraged Lee to consider simply holding a strong defensive position while waiting for the Union troops to make the first move. Longstreet believed that this tactic would give the South the strongest strategic advantage in the battle. However, Lee rejected this plan, stating, "... the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there" (Longstreet, 1987, p. 160).
On the Northern side, Lincoln had recently placed General George Gordon Meade in position in the Gettysburg area. Captain Samuel Fiske of the Union army wrote in his 1866 memoirs that there was a growing feeling of optimism among the Union troops at the opening of the Battle of Gettysburg. Fiske wrote that the Union troops stationed at Gettysburg were veteran fighters and that there were few sick soldiers among them. Fiske stated that "the Potomac Army, reduced greatly in numbers ... is still a very numerous and formidable army" Fiske, 1987, p. 111). Another eyewitness account of the Battle of Gettysburg was provided by Private Warren Lee Goss of the Union Army. In his recollections, Goss stated that the Northern soldiers were well aware of the strategic importance of the battle. Not only the commanding officers, but the men themselves realized the crucial nature of maintaining a barrier between Lee's forces and the cities of the North. As Goss later wrote, "... the common soldier recog
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