tionship with God by following a system of ethics; rather, by following their "absolute duty to God," they are able to do good.
As an example of the proper progression of the ethical and the absolute, Kierkegaard looked at the love of neighbors. Following ethics, people are to love their neighbors as fellow humans. In the hope of extending that love to God, it is often said that people love God through their neighbors. This has the effect of diluting the concept of God and making God incapable of receiving love directly:
Insofar, then, as someone might wish to love God . . . he is a visionary, is in love with a phantom, which, if it had the power to speak, would say to him: I do not ask for your love--just stay where you belong . . . this love would be . . . implausible (68).
This is a reversal of priorities. Duty to God must come before a contrived system of ethics. It is more fitting for people to love God with all their hearts and let that love spread to their fellow human beings. A relationship with God is only possible when God becomes the focus of a person's life.
To set aside the ethical issues in favor of the absolute is to practice what Kierkegaard termed the "teleological suspension of the ethical" (59), and this leads to a paradox. Through
faith, a person's actions are not necessarily in accordance with ethical principles; however, that person's actions will still be judged by others as good. It seems quite a gamble to hope to achieve the ethical through the "unethical." What possible assurance can there be of success? This assurance is found in faith, and those who have faith need no assurance, because their focus is on their duty to God; ethical issues are secondary.
The difference between a person of faith and a tragic hero is that purpose for a person of faith is outside the realm of the ethical, whereas purpose for a tragic hero is still in the realm of the ethical (69). An example ...