limited. The rationale for that protection is set forth in the quotation by Justice Holmes in the statement, the importance in a free society of allowing truth to emerge from the free competition of ideas and the dangers of permitting government censorship or other interference with free public debate. In Whitney v. California, (274 U.S. 357 (1927)), Justice Brandeis interpreted the intention of the framers of the Constitution, as follows: "They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without freedom of speech and assembly discussion would be futile." As the Court put it in New York Times v. Sullivan, (376 U.S. 254 (1964)) (discussed below), the constitutional protection of free speech reflects "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and open."
In a series of cases between 1917 and 1927, the Court generally upheld state sedition laws, subject only to the clear and present danger doctrine first laid down by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. U.S., (249 U.S. 47 (1917)). In Whitney, Justice Brandeis said for the majority that the rights of free speech and press "are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral." In Dennis v. U.S., (341 U.S. 497 (1951)), the Court upheld the convictions of Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act which proscribed actions taken in furtherance of a conspiracy to advocate the violent overthrow of the government. The Court found that defendants' actions presented a sufficient danger that they would lead to violent overthrow that they warranted the application of the statute. Dennis, however, left some doubt as to whether defendants had been convicted for their tea...