ury version of globalism (by way of the fin de siècle continental armaments race, which Wawro does mention, and the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, which he does not) can all, in a broad sense, be traced to Napoleon's policies, procedures, and programs. Wawro does not develop this point specifically, but it is difficult not to see the shadow of Napoleon--until the last stages almost always an efficiently purposive warrior--looming over such debacles as the Russo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, or for that matter over the wretchedly incompetent miscalculations made by Great War strategists in 1914.
Beginning with the inexorable Napoleonic military juggernaut across Europe and his accession to an imperial throne meant to supplant the Holy Roman Empire, Wawro proceeds to examine the consequences of his egomaniacal concentration of power--first in France, then wherever his ambition took him--and the consequences to Europe of his displacement. The principal point he makes about Napoleon's modus operandi as general is that he was determined to extract loyalty from his army and his people by means of strategic thinking. Napoleon made himself visible and available to the rank and file, not just the aristocratically inclined officer corps, and he gave awards to both officers and men--medals and honors on one hand, and duchies and estates on the other (18).
Wawro's evaluation of Napoleon's imperial activity is contained in his discussion of the multiple civil reforms he instituted, not only in France but also in the territories he conquered. Whatever one may think of Napoleon as ruler or general, indeed, it is difficult not to recognize in his actions and ideology a modernist turn of mind. That helps explain why he involved himself not only in military campaigns but also in implementing what he took to be political and social reforms of the kind that had been implemented in France. Societal transformation that had occurred in the Revolution and durin...