objects and psychological objects are distinct from one another. HusserlÕs theory of phenomenology attempts to place itself in the camp of logic and mathematical exactitude. Husserl distinguishes between two sciences, one objective and the other rigorous. Objective science, the science of phenomenology, attempts to preserve the laws of logic and of fundamental mathematical principles. This science rejects all presuppositions, aiming to provide an unassailable foundation from which all other sciences would flow. Pure logic, Husserl reasoned, would be free from psychological premises and the doubt that naturally attends them: "Science without presuppositions: this was the primary quality. To achieve this, it had to renounce all hypotheses and constructions and confine itself to asserting what could not be doubted. This, it was to be a nonconstructive science, one that stated only what was evident" (Tatarkiewicz 47).
Husserl distinguishes objective science from rigorous science by attempting to distinguish between that which is an inherent aspect of the consciousness of humanity and that which is a construct of the mind. At first glance, this is a continuance of the debate between empiricism and metaphysics. How to the senses tamper with what is perceived? Can one finally know anything about that which is abstract? Can one deduce metaphysical assertions from logic?
Husserl goes as far as to assert that the m
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