d governments, and to bring to the attention of the international community violations of individual rights.
Van Ness (1996) cites some 20 separate human-rights agreements successfully negotiated at the U.N. over the course of its history as proof of the U.N.'s ability to shape a culture of shared values on the diplomatic scene. American membership on the U.N. Human Rights Commission has been associated with the fact that during the 1990s the P.R.C. signed two U.N. Covenants on economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights, partly as a way of avoiding formal censure through a U.S.-sponsored resolution critical of the Beijing regime (Goldman, 2001).
However, Van Ness also says that the values have by no means been put into practice because of the tendency of member states, including both China and the U.S., to ignore human-rights violations by friendly states and to "forcefully condemn" violations by geopolitical opponents (Van Ness, 1996).
P.R.C. admission to the U.N. in 1971 and ouster of the Republic of China (Taiwan/Formosa) confirmed as an official geopolitical matter what had been the de facto case since 1949, that the ROC could not, as it had claimed for some 20 years, credibly represent the mainland internationally. The P.R.C. assumed Taiwan's membership in all U.N. bodies, including its permanent seat on the Security Council. However, after joining the U.N. in 1971, the P.R.C. "refused to participate in the Commission on Human Rights, preferring to expand on the subject of human rights in the Economic and Social Council and in particular in the Commission on the Status of Women." When the P.R.C. did speak on the subject, Copper explains, it
seemed to define human rights in terms of rectifying problems or abuses fostered by imperialism, colonialism, and racism. References were to "collective rights"; the appeal was to nationalism. Chinese representatives resisted any mention of Hong Kong or Macao or Tibet ...