ence of pain or peril within the community. To the greater good of all, individual wishes for happiness or the experience may sometimes have to be subordinated. Mill does hypothesize that some in the greater community are more suited to determining the content of happiness for the whole, but he does not base this judgment on traditional presumptions of privilege, which for Mill may have been the monarchical hereditary privilege. Rather, he bases it on the presumption that those who are more suited to making such determinations have carefully educated and otherwise prepared themselves for the purpose. The nobility may or may not of necessity fall into this category; however, the historical context in which Mill was writing suggests that, at least in the utilitarian utopian near term, the more educated classes would of necessity also intersect with the wealthier, noble classes, which had the depth and range of experience to suit them to the tasks of governance.
Mill does not treat the issue of conscription directly, but his attitude toward the notion of conscription as a policy of the state may be inferred from his discussion of the ideal form of the utilitarian state. For example, the discussion of the position of educated classes has relevance for the issue of conscription to the extent that conscription may be perceived as an instance of the sacrifice of the rights or comfort of the individual for the good or security of the whole society. In addition, the judgment of the quality of such a sacrifice would be made by those doing the conscripting, not the conscriptees, with a view toward the greatest good of the whole society on whose behalf the conscription is undertaken.
What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is
worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except
the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When,
therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasur...