cost the United States of vital political support in the region.
Second, minerals vital to the American defense effort are available to the United States only from South Answana. The imposition by the United States of a harsh policy with respect to debt repayment and economic reform by South Answana might well cost the United States access to these vital minerals. Third, the policies of the American dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) are partly responsible for South Answana's economic predicament. The imposition by the United States of a harsh policy with respect to debt repayment and economic reform by South Answana in such circumstances might well cost the United States the support and goodwill of other Third World countries. Fourth, American commercial banks and commercial banks in other western developed countries are highly exposed in the South Answanian debt crisis, as well as being highly exposed in the external debt positions of most other Third World countries. To permit the government of South Answana to default on all or part of its external debt would prove costly to western commercial banks. If the South Answanian action were emulated by other Third World countries, massive commercial banking failures could occur in the United States and in other western developed countries.
The National Security Council (NSA) prefers the adoption of an American policy position on the South Answanian external debt issue which will not rock the political boat in the central region of Sub Saharan Africa. Thus, the NSA supports a position which, while it would require no cessation of principal and interest payments on its external debt by South Answana, would also provide American grants to that country on a surreptitious basis to assure that such payments could be made by the South Answanian government. The policy position supported by the NSA is desirable in order to protect American political and strategic inter...