future recipients of the legislated benefits of the proposed Medicare legislation were mobilized to lobby for its enactment, the primary demanders for the legislation were not the elderly persons so mobilized, but, rather, organ ized groups with an economic self interest in a functioning Medicare program (Feldstein, 1988). Chief among these inter est groups were health care professional associations and major labor unions.
Health care professionals had a self interest in the pro posed Medicare program, because its implementation would (1) incrase usage of the health care system, thereby, promoting their own economic well being, and (2) would provide greater assurance of payment for services delivered, thereby protecting their own financial integrity.
Self interest was equally strong for the nation's major labor unions. The mid 1950s had marked the high point in labor 3
union membership and political inflcence in the United States. When the Medicare battles were being fought in the 1960s, labor union power was already on the wane. By acting as an advocate for the nation's elderly population segment in the Medicare battle, the labor movement hoped to gain a badly needed new constituency.
The elderly population segment who would benefit from implementation of the Medicare program most certainly had a self interest in promoting its enactment. As a universal program, Medicare would cause some proportion of the national income to redistributed in favor of the program recipients. As some of the proposed program's benefits were to be funded by recipient paid premiums, however, the self interests of the elderly segment of the population were not as strong as were those of the health care prefessional associations and the major labor unions.
As providers, the nation's socially and fiscally liberal federal politicians also had a self interest in seeking enact ment of the Medicare legislation. These politicians had long ag...