r the application of this principle was, more often than not, impractical, if not impossible. Sea power occasionally provided such capability, but not often. Land armies are almost never able to strike at an enemy's base in modern warfare, except in conjunction with air or sea power. The Second World War marked the first application in war of long range air power.5
A second principle of strategic war is strike an enemy's communications.6 In this context, destruction, or, at least, significant interference with an enemy's transportation network is essential. The interdiction of an enemy's command and control network is also desirable.
A third principle of strategic war is the destruction of an enemy's armed forces.7 Clausewitz held that this principle was the first objective of war, and that it is best accomplished by direct attack.8
Effective strategy must also recognize that war is both a social and a psychological phenomenon.9 In this context, total war can neither be understood nor effectively waged, if attempts are made to isolate it from the social and economic background of which it is a part, from the motives of the political leaders of the antagonists, or from human impulses. Military strength is dependent upon economic strength.10
An effective strategy must also be flexible.11 Strategy must be prepared to deal with the unexpected, and must never be wedded to past actions. Although tested strategic approaches are often valuable, a thorough assessment of the strategic problem must always be made. From war to war, the nature of the essential strategic problem often changes, and, in such circumstances, for a military organization, "there is no surer way to disaster than to take what has been done for many years, and to go on doing it . . . ."12
The foregoing described and explained the conceptual framework within which the Allied strategic air operations in the Second World War are analyzed and assessed. ...