pansion and empowerment of the central government.
The aftermath of war usually creates a new shape for the state-one more often of ideologies and less personal freedom than before. Porter argues that totalitarianism is the apex of the increase of state power and demonstrated during the 20th century how wars were not always fought for personal liberty and freedom, but to increase the role, scope and power of the central governments waging them. He admits, albeit with a shy, blushing hue, that the United States may represent a semi-partial exception to this rule, but one gets the feeling from the actual facts that he feels compelled to admit this due to nationality than empirical evidence. He gives ample evidence, however, to support his contention that the role of war in history has been to shape states in their aftermath. He covers the Napoleonic Wars and how they changed the landscape of feudal Europe. He discusses the huge losses of Russian armies after the Revolution and the glorification of war by totalitarian governments in the 20th century all always for the good of the state. This actually undermines human liberty because the good of the state necessarily implies individual loyalty to the state above all else, “The feverish nationalism that engulfed Europe in August 1914 attested to the status that the nation-state had attained as the supreme claimant on human loyalty” (170). Quite a persuasive argument when one considers that this type
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