policy was direct communication, usually by telephone. A study of White House logs shows the enormous time he spent on the phone talking to legislators, cajoling them, persuading them, and twisting their arms. He was a legislator above all. His method was to formulate a legislative plan, and then assemble the forces necessary to see it through.
Foreign policy was a different matter. Johnson inherited from Kennedy the tendency not to communicate with Congress on major foreign policy initiatives. In Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam, "Congressional leaders were informed of, but not consulted about, major steps." In the crucial Gulf of Tonkin incident, which began the wholesale escalation of the Vietnam War, Johnson called in Congressional leaders to ratify a decision he had already made. In later years, he came close to admitting that the incident may have been exaggerated or even fabricated so as to justify his policy decision.
Nonetheless, it was in his relations with Congress that Johnson enjoyed his greatest strength. The former Senate majority leader and one of the most skilled legislators of his era, he knew Congress, its rules, and its personalities intimately. Though he claimed he wanted a "consensus presidency", Johnson's idea of consensus owed less to persuasion than to pressure. A member of his staff described Johnson's approach to gaining a consensus by paraphrasing the Book of Isaiah: "Come let us reason together, you little chickenshit". As a Senate leader, Johnson had demanded and enforced party discipline. As a president, he behaved no differently. The use of power was a private matter to him. As the late Senator Fulbright said: "It is all personal, because he has never shown any interest in issues or substantive matters."
Johnson's relations with his staff reflected his legislative approach. He demanded absolute loyalty and total support. He was widely quoted in the press as saying t...