hroughout history have primarily acted in loose ways when doing research, though they would speak quite differently when pontificating about it (Feyerabend, 1995).
This type of argument seems to shift the philosophy of science from empiricist and rationalist foundations. From the empiricist perspective, in order for scientific propositions to be such they had to be verified, falsified or corroborated by facts (in inductive theories the facts lead to propositions; in falsification theories the facts select propositions). To someone like Popper, science seemed a ruthless confrontation between language and the world (Putnam, 1996). Yet the philosophy of science being articulated by Feyerabend seems to be a confrontation between theories, therefore between flesh-and-blood scientists with their prejudices and passions.
This view sees scientific theories less and less as a mirror of nature and more and more resembling the development and survival of living species. Theories exist in a world of facts, they do not mirror it but live in it. Consequently there are a myriad of other possible "true theories." At the root of this shift is the observation that there are numerous facts which do not agree with even the best established theories. Yet these recalcitrant facts, in and of themselves, are not enough to falsify the theory. Facts can falsify only if a rival theory can account for them. They seem to falsify only in a competitive game between theories seeking to survive and prosper. Furthermore, theories survive and grow not only because they adapt to their environment but also because they can reproduce. In animal species, it is not only the strongest that perpetuates itself but also the male who "seduces" more females and the female who "seduces" more males. In terms of this metaphor Popperianism highlighted only the relation between individuals and the environment. What remains outside is Feyerabend's stance focusing on the...