Intelligence Failure and Sept. 11
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In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Hereafter referred to as 9/11), Americans were horrified at the sheer audacity and malicious inventiveness of the Al-Qaida operatives. The nation wondered how these men could have resided in the country for an extended period of time, planning their bold strike, without attracting any attention from our various federal and state law enforcement agencies. In the protracted period of soul searching that has followed 9/11, an answer to that question seems to have emerged. The answer, quite simply, is that 9/11 represents the greatest intelligence failure in our nation's historyłgreater even than the lapse in intelligence that resulted in Pearl Harbor. Various different federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had opportunities to identify the terrorists and infiltrate the plot. Each agency failed miserably, however, and the result was tragic not just for the 3,000 men and women who lost their lives on September 11, 2001, but for our national psyche as a whole. The United States will never be the same country again, our period of innocence before the emerging international reality of terrorism has been shattered. The intelligence failures that resulted in this sad reality will be the focus of this paper. First we will provide a brief sketch of the Intelligence Community in the United Sta
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Community. According to this Congressional inquiry, the FBI was not equipped to produce intelligence products and was unable to adequately defend against the domestic threat from foreign terrorists (JIC, 37-39). The report focused its criticisms on the following areas:
Domestic threats: "The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States" (JIC, xv).
Ability to conduct all-source analyses: "The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies" (JIC, 37)
Centraliziation of domestic intelligence efforts: "The FBI's 56 field offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilu
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Approximate Word count = 2580
Approximate Pages = 10 (250 words per page)
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