ility, and social chaos were all growing. Even so, "the Middle-Aged White Superpredator did not fit the needs of Governor Pete Wilson (Republican) . . . Senator Diane [sic] Feinstein (Democrat) . . . or other political aspirants" (Males, 1999, p. 69). Accordingly, says Males, half of money earmarked for new prison projects went for facilities housing juvenile offenders, though juveniles were responsible for only 15% of the crime. In short, the numbers do not support the myth.
Males goes into some detail about the correlation between poverty, class, and violent behavior, including the observable fact that patterns of ingrained violence manifest most strongly in adult, not teenage, populations. However, with respect to juvenile delinquency more generally, Males concludes that the discourse of the subject has been deeply flawed, preferring flash over substance and fear over facts:
Today's debate over violent crime is driven by sensational anecdotes, mangled statistics, and long-discredited notions of the causes of crime more appropriate to 1898 than 1998. In the face of clear trends and developments suggesting dramatic new patterns in American violence that demand new and imaginative analysis, criminologists and officials have responded with Model-T crime theory (Males, 1999, p. 69).
The mangled-statistics point is relevant because it shows how selective use of supposedly authoritative research can distort perceptions. Males cites the false comparison that was reported between the decline of crime in general and the rise of youth crime in particular, by way of use of crime reports for the former tendency and actual arrests for the latter. As for the "Model-T" theory, it comes down to the idea that juveniles "age out" of crime, that they become less violent as they grow up. That flies in the face of evidence of the embedded violence that follows or guides many adults into their middle years. It also fails to capture the fact that t...