es were being signed at the rate of nearly $10 billion per year. In addition, private sales of arms were beginning to exceed $1 billion per year. Finally, surplus government military supplies were also being transferred to foreign governments at little or no cost. By 1976, the export of military supplies and services was valued at about 5% of all American exports and 0.3% of the Gross National Product (Brewer 222-23).
Military assistance has long been used as a means of gaining influence over a foreign government. Although an immediate effect may be the strengthening of one government in relation to another, hostile, government, the long-term effect is often the friendship of the government receiving the assistance. In this way, the United States can gain the support of the assisted countries for certain policies. This purpose has replaced the original purpose of helping one country defend itself against an enemy, especially since most of the countries receiving assistance have never been engaged in any violent conflict (Brewer 223).
The American defeat in the Vietnam War had a chilling effect on the willingness of American leaders to commit large military forces anywhere in the world, especially to Southeast Asia. They believed that Americans should not commit themselves so heavily to the defense of Asian interests when Asian countries could contribute more to their own defense. Some efforts were made in the middle part of the 1970s to involve Japan more in the security relationships in Southeast Asia. This effort, however, was resisted by many Asian nations, who still remembered Japanese aggression earlier in the century (Buszynski 227-29).
At the same time, the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was redefined as a balance of power problem. By defining the conflict in this manner, U.S. leaders conceded that the Soviet Union could have a role in Southeast Asia. Yet, they also believed...