placed around him, and that it was Kissinger's own perspective and abilities that accounted in large measure for the generally successful performance of the Nixon administration in foreign affairs.
For the Nixon record is remarkably bifurcated. At home, the dominant fact of his presidency was the manner in which he left it. The deep atmosphere of suspicion in American public life did not begin with Watergate. It was already developing during the escalation of the Vietnam War, and in some ways it goes back to the early days of the Cold War. But it was greatly exacerbated under Nixon; it is not for nothing that "-gate" has become a conventional suffix for public scandals or even minor imbroglios. (Thus, a flap over the White House travel office in Clinton's first year was sometimes called "travelgate.") Nor does Watergate somehow stand apart from the rest of Nixon's domestic performance; indeed, as we shall see, it was in a sense the culmination of his entire domestic political career.
Abroad, however, and in spite of inheriting a debacle in Vietnam, the Nixon administration's record was one of success, most vividly symbolized by the opening to China. More generally, and in spite of a growing public mood of quasi-isolationism, Nixon succeeded in playing a leading and generally positive role in the world in a way that no president since him has equalled.
Richard Nixon proved to be a paradox as president. In internal affairs, his record as chief of state was disastrous . . . In external affairs, however, Nixon's record shows a remarkable divergence from his behavior in the scandal that will always be associated with his name. Nixon's foreign policy was, on the whole a glowing success with important long-term results (Sulzberger, 1987, p. 1).
We must attribute much of that success to Kissinger. He makes a striking contrast to Nixon's other most influential appointments. On the domestic front, the men who had the great...