and an end to Castro's rule. The second is the refusal of many right-wing politicians (and their constituents) to give in to a communist government that actively opposed the U.S. in every respect for many decades. The third reason is Castro's continued refusal to allow democratic government and cease human rights violations. The fourth reason, however, is the most important. Castro himself has made excellent use of anti-American feeling in the midst of severe economic hardship in the 1990s and has often taken defiant actions counter to American interests and scornful of internal attempts at political liberalization, the backbone of American demands. Castro has, in fact, "fetishized [Cuba's] political independence from the United States" and may look to "securing a place in history as a hero who resisted the Americans to the end" as his principal legacy. The American government's position, therefore, is based in very large part on the strong belief that Castro's anti-Americanism is unlikely to disappear of its own accord and that any cooperative efforts (economic or political) would be subject to failure as soon as Castro perceived some practical political advantage in defying the U.S.
The fact that Castro's Cuba has, thus far, managed some aspects of the transition from dependency more smoothly than many of the nations formerly in the Soviet sphere of influence has not made the United States' position any easier. At first the government's chances of survival seemed terrible. From 1972, when Cuba entered the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (the Soviet-backed common market), until 1985 Cuba's economy grew by almost 6 percent annually. But the sudden loss of the Soviet subsidies resulted in a 66 percent reduction of Cuba's foreign commerce "and the terms of trade for the remaining third deteriorated by 40 percent." The economy went into free-fall as the Cuban government was faced with the disappearance of basic impo...