invaded the Netherlands provinces (Ross, 1969, p. 66). After Napoleon's seizure of power, Britain would establish itself as France's principle opponent.
From the beginning, the British ministers relied upon a maritime strategy to fight the French. They realized that the geographical position and the limited population of the British Isles restricted their ability to confront enemies in land battles on the continent. Britain simply could not support a large army, although its relative geographical isolation protected it from enemies with large armies. Its geographical position also forced its merchant class to build up a thriving sea trade, which became vital to the overall economy. Protection of this trade was the natural responsibility of the Royal Navy, which received a lot of money and attention from the government (Kennedy, 1976, pp. 128 29).
Around the protection of this vital interest developed a school of thought which not only emphasized sea power as the protector of the British economy but also visualized sea power as the key to defeating major continental powers while limiting British casualties. Although preeminent in British strategic thought since early in the 17th Century, this theory proved unsuccessful during the 18th Century, when Britain was forced to commit large ground forces on the continent. However, many saw the new conflict with France as an opportunity to further secure trade routes and enhance Britain's economic power by eliminating French naval bases around the world (Kennedy, 1976, p. 129). But the British were not eager to engage the French in a land war on the Continent and in the 1790s the French government did not openly display the expansionist policies which would later become the trademark of Napoleon (Palmer & Colton, 1984, 368).
The main feature of Britain's maritime strategy was an emphasis upon actions in the colonies. The natural reason for this virtual preoccupation was econ...