ffairs, but underlying that discussion is the sense that there is a certain growing rift between what the framers intended in the Constitution and what we have today.
Chapter One delves into the power struggle between Congress and the President, a struggle which has particular importance for the governance of foreign affairs. While the Constitution embodied the idea of a balance of powers so that no one branch of government would be superior over any other, in practice from the beginning Congress and the President have jockeyed for position and have shown some tension over which branch will control different aspects of governance. In terms of the governance of foreign affairs, the issue has been over whether Congress has any role in foreign affairs at all, what that role will be, and whether the powers of the executive over foreign affairs can be curtailed or controlled by the legislative branch. Henkin notes that the Constitution did give the legislature some important roles in foreign affairs, especially that of declaring war. The President was given the power to make treaties, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The President is also designated Commander in Chief by the Constitution, and in this role Presidents have long claimed more and more powers in foreign affairs as part of that function.
Henkin agrees that the Constitution does not address these issues fully, but he feels that the framers did not articulate eve
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