t follows is primarily a strategic evaluation of this campaign, commonly known as the Seven Days or Wilderness campaign. (The usage "Seven Days" will be preferred here, since "Wilderness" invites confusion with the much later Battle of the Wilderness.) That evaluation in turn is largely centered on the character of General McClellan, since the campaign was his to lose.
Robert E. Lee as the victorious general might seem deserving of greater attention, but in the Seven Days, he was only beginning to develop his powers, and was able only to take partial advantage of McClellan's weaknesses. Indeed, at Malvern Hill his attempt to capitalize on the Union retreat seriously misfired, and had McClellan been more aggressive in following up on the Confederate setback, he might have delivered a decisive victory. It is thus McClellan's lost opportunities, and his reason for failing to sieze them, that are the primary focus of our concern.
The plan of this discussion is as follows: The overall course of the Seven Days will be briefly outlined, followed by an evaluation of the factors that might have made a Union victory in that campaign decisive for the course of the war. Focus will then be turned upon McClellan's behavior, and particularly his response to intelligence information that exaggerated Confederate strength, and his failure to capitalize on Malvern Hill. In conclusion, a comparison of McClellan and Lee in the Seven Days campaign will be offered as illustration of some basic principles of generalship.
The Seven Days began on June 25, when after several weeks of preparation (and repeated claims that he would begin the advance in a day or two), McClellan's army of 90,000 to 100,000 men began to advance along both banks of the Chickahominy River. The battle plan called for an unsubtle but relentless advance that would push Union artillery within firing range of the defenses of Richmond.
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