Alexander the Great as a Military Leader

Alexander the Great's skills and accomplishments as a military leader and his shortcomings as well as his gifts in consolidating his victories in the realm of politics.

King at 20 and dead of fever at 33, Alexander in 13 years conquered most of the known world, generally in the face of insuperable odds. He was able to do so in part because he inherited a superb army, an alliance and a sense of mission from his father, King Philip II of Macedon, but most of all because he excelled in all the arts of war. An extraordinarily brave and inspiring leader in battle, Alexander shared the privations and sufferings of his small band of devoted followers and spurred them on to feats of endurance and courage unparalleled in ancient history.

Alexander's tactical and strategic genius as a military leader was coupled with remarkable political astuteness which enabled him to retain and capitalize upon his conquests. Free of any political ideology other than belief in Greek civilization and his own destiny, he was ruthless toward his enemies but surprisingly moderate toward many individuals and peoples he conquered. He knew how to expand the power of his small conquering force by accommodating to local custom and by making clever use of religious beliefs. However, toward the end of his life, his dream of an Eurasian empire may have caused him to succumb to a touch of megalomania and to lose touch with his own

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ber 331. Battle of Gaugamela (or Arbela) Alexander marched into Mesopotamia with an army of about 47,000, but Darius had amassed a force of perhaps five times that size (Lucas 18). For the Battle of Gaugamela, Darius selected a flat plain which favored the deployment of a large force which Alexander thoroughly scouted. He developed a square like formation, similar to the indian fighting tactics of the American West, which enabled his formations to turn and fight in all directions if necessary to prevent being subject to a double envelopment or becoming surrounded. In the battle itself, Alexander maintained in the rear a thin phalanx of Thessalian infantry which, according to Dupuy and Dupuy, "was probably the first recorded use of a tactical reserve" (49). Despite the huge numerical disparity, Alexander's forces attacked first on their right and drifted obliquely to the right causing the Persian defenders to shift in that direction. As they did so, they opened up a gap. The Persians struck the flank of the charging Companions hard but were repulsed by a reserve Alexander had posted to meet that eventuality. He then exploited the gap in the Persian lines and, as at Issus, smashed through the left-center of the Persian line. Dar
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Approximate Word count = 5390
Approximate Pages = 22 (250 words per page)

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