ocratic elections.
Lewis says that, during the interwar period (1920-1939), "political Pan-Islamism . . . was a hopeless cause" (146) supressed by colonial and conservative Muslim regimes alike, a process which continued after World War II and into the 1970s. Society was to a significant degree secularized, but Islam remained the state religion of all nations in which Muslims were in a majority. Even the strongest nationalists and advocates of modernization, such as Kemal Ataturk in Turkey in the interwar period, Gamal Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s and the Shah of Iran and Anwar Sadat of Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s, respected the hold of traditional Islam on the masses and sought to portray their reforms as advancing the cause of pan-Islamism or, at least in the case of Nasser and Sadat, pan-Arabism.
As the post-colonial elite began to pass from the scene, pan-Islamism, in the form of the Islamic revival or Muslim fundamentalism, burst on the scene in the 1970s, especially after the triumph of Ayatollah Kho
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