U.S. Involvement in Bosnia During the 1990s

This research paper traces the evolution of American involvement in and international strategy toward Bosnia during the period beginning with the outbreak of war among indigenous forces there in early 1992 and continuing to the present time.

1. 1991-1992. The United States failed to develop an effective international strategy for coping with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia in large part because after the Cold War, its senior policy makers during the Bush administration did not view the United States as having any vital national interests involved in that conflict and, was therefore, determined to leave the diplomatic initiative for its resolution to the Europeans and to avoid at all costs any use of American military force;

2. 1993-mid-1994. During the first year and a half of the Clinton administration, policy confusion characterized American strategy toward the war in Bosnia; however, the United States became increasingly more deeply involved in an attempt to achieve a diplomatic solution and was impelled to consider more forceful measures to end the fighting and associated humanitarian disasters. It failed, however, to match its more interventionist rhetoric with appropriate actions.

3. Mid-1994-1995. The United States eventually asserted foreign policy leadership in seeking a negotiated end to the war which involved the use of coercive diplomacy and NATO airpower against the Bosnian Serbs

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them, Bosnia and Macedonia recognition, but Baker also said: "our vital national interests were not at stake. The Yugoslav conflict had the potential to be intractable, but it was nonetheless a regional dispute . . . there was an undercurrent in Washington, felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show they could act as a unified power" (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 201). Bert characterized Bush's policy toward Bosnia as "one of strict non-intervention based on the premise that no important U.S. interest was at stake there" but that it was accompanied by rhetoric which included "a stinging rhetoric of Serbian aggression and a promise it would not be tolerated" (p. 11). Bert said that after the Cold War ended, "the collapse of the Soviet threat led to a kind of indifference to many global developments on the part of the United States" and "Third World conflicts were no longer given high priority" (p. 2). He said "the US found itself without a clear mission for its armed forces, and with a realization that the military would see few crises jeopardizing its vital interests and requiring a quick response that would automatically be supported by the public" (p. 7). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 3692
Approximate Pages = 15 (250 words per page)

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