Appointing Associate Justices to the Supreme Court
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The process of appointing Associate Justices to the United States Supreme Court in the latter part of the twentieth century has become a highly contentious, politically charged, and extremely expensive ordeal. From the founding of the Supreme Court through the early portion of the twentieth-century, appointments were administered primarily as political patronage. However, by the 1980s, the process of appointing judges to our highest Court has become so contentious that the rate of judges rejected by Congress has continued to accelerate. The first section of this paper will contain a historical overview of the development of the Supreme Court as well as the transformation of the appointment process. Section two will look at two models proposed by political scientists to explain the nature of this transformation. Section three will summarize the first two sections and explain which model seems most accurate in explaining the contemporary judicial appointment process. Finally, using this model as well as additional evidence, a forecast of future events will be rendered. Based on present conditions and the models, it is unfortunate that this forecast will be bleak. In the ante-bellum period of American history, Supreme Court appointments were primarily motivated by political patronage. Often Presidents saw the High Court as an excellent means of repaying a loyal election contributors. In fact, Supreme Court appointments were generally considered only as
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pport from liberal Senators; and the case of Robert Bork, whose conservative views caused liberal Senators to reject his appointment (Cameron, Cover, and Segal, 1990, 525).
Cameron, Cover, and Segal studied 2,054 confirmation votes from Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy. Based on this study, they came up with four reasons which influence how Senators vote during the confirmation process. First, a Senator's vote depends on the goals he pursues during the process. Second, the choices confronting a Senator during each voting stage. Third, a Senator's vote seems to depend on how much foresight that Senator has from one stage to the next in a multistage agenda. Fourth, a Senator's vote depends on the payoffs or punishments he/she expects to receive as a result of their vote (Cameron, Cover, & Segal, 1990, 527).
The three researchers believe that Senators have a variety of goals in mind which influence their vote. These goals can include the pursuit of a sincere vision of what they believe is in the public's interest. Cameron, Cover, and Segal label this goal rationally nonstrategic behavior in which the Senator's sincere political views are not motivated by desires for personal gain (Cameron, Cover, & Segal, 1990, 527).
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Approximate Word count = 3527
Approximate Pages = 14 (250 words per page)
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