ous process, and when she notes that neonatology is consistently pushing back the date of viability. However, she strays from her strength when she starts to use scare tactics, noting that people who support late abortions are "logically led to endorse selective infanticide." This seems an unjust accusation and it would be very unlikely for pro-choice feminists argue for this.
Another strong argument for her, however, is her statement that women and minorities were also earlier denied full personhood, like the fetus is now. This definition of who is a person is a dangerous one, because it allows for the denial of rights to those who have been dehumanized. Her complaint that philosophers set the standard for personhood impossibly high is also a good one. Many people would not qualify as fully human under some standard definitions of what that means.
However, Callahan did not make a full and complete argument that her position represents a more inclusive understanding of justice. It seems incomplete at the end in which she descends, again, to using inflammatory language and appeals to stereotypes about "maternal thinking."
Autonomy and choice. Callahan's argument in this section is an interesting one. She notes that part of moral behavior certainly includes willing, making moral decisions. She also asserts that it requires a certain amount of acceptance of the unexpected, however, and a responsiveness to the inbreaking of chance. Thus, as she notes correctly, all kinds of events and relationships arise in our lives that we must then respond to in a moral way. Pregnancy may be one of those situations, and for Callahan, it clearly is.
However, her argument weakens in the second half when she asserts that the pro-life position is the only one that focuses on the importance of interdependence and interrelationship. She condemns the pro-choice position as basically individualistic and autonomous, ignoring the requi...