with foreign debts to non-Arab nations of about $50.5 billion (three times its GDP), plus Gulf loans and credits of another $45 to $55 billion, including a debt to Kuwait of $14 billion . Iraq's ability to repay these debts was hampered by the declining world price of oil. At a series of meetings among the leaders of Arab countries in early 1990, Saddam Hussein demanded relief from this debt burden in form of lower oil production by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which had exceeded their OPEC production quotas and tens of billions of dollars in cash payments from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states. At the final meeting between Iraq and Kuwait on July 31, 1990, Friedman said he demanded "$10 billion plus some territory and drilling rights." According to Friedman, the August 2, 1990 invasion was the equivalent of "a debtor canceling his debt by robbing the bank."
Even though it had been weakened by the long Iran-Iraq war, Iraq, with its 1.2 million man army, which was supported by substantial armor, artillery and aircraft, had become the leader of the anti-Israel cause. It also had acquired chemical weapons, intermediate range missiles and an embryonic biological and nuclear weapons capability. After 1988 Iraq "continued its long-term aim of achieving . . . military parity with Israel."
Under the Carter Doctrine adopted in 1979 after the Khomeini Revolution in Iran and the taking of American hostages there, the United States had identified the Gulf Region as a region of vital national interest. According to Brzezinski et al., "during the 1980s, the United States st
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