effort to end the conflict as quickly as possible, the United States would start out with minimal involvement and then gradually increase its air attacks and other forms of military intervention against North Vietnam (Burdick, 1984, p. 214). This approach was adopted because it showed the seriousness of U.S. intentions and bolstered the morale of the South Vietnamese people, while simultaneously showing China and the Soviet Union "that American goals were limited and did not threaten the existence of their ally" (Burdick, 1984, p. 214). However, gradualism limited the effectiveness of the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. In particular, it prohibited an all-out display of American air power until the final stages of the war. It can only be wondered whether an earlier utilization of air power might have brought the conflict in Vietnam to a quicker and easier resolution.
U.S. air bombing raids into North Vietnam increased notably during the summer of 1972. This increase came about in part as a retaliation to renewed invasions into South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese. In addition, it represented a change in military doctrine which had taken place between the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Whereas Johnson had favored easing into military operations in Vietnam, Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger believed that Johnson's policy of gradualism "had not been forceful enough" and that it sent the message that the United States "was afraid to conduct a sustained, hard, coordinated air and naval operation against the enemy" (Nixon's blitz, 1973, p. 12). Nixon's rejection of the previous doctrine led to the development and implementation of the Linebacker II campaign in December, 1972.
In the months prior to the campaign, peace negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam had reached a standstill. In March, 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a large-scale offensive into the Sout...