lso expressed concern about Libya's construction of an underground chemical weapons production facility. Libya has active chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles programs.
The report concluded with an outline of the Pentagon's Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, first announced by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in December 1993. The program's objectives are--in order of importance--to: (1) prevent the acquisition of WMD and missiles; (2) roll back proliferations where it occurs; (3) deter the use of WMD and missiles; and (4) adapt military forces and planning to respond to regional situations where U.S. forces face WMD threats.
However, just six days later, on April 17, 1996 a State Department official announced that the administration would deliver $368 million in conventional weapons to Pakistan. The transfer would include Harpoon anti-ship missiles and AIM-9 anti-aircraft missiles in direct contradiction of the administration's Counterproliferation Initiative. State and Defense Department officials said the transfer would strengthen ties with Pakistan and insisted the administration remained "committed to a responsible implementation of its non-proliferation policy." This, despite a recent CIA report alleging that Pakistan bought 5,000 Chinese ring magnets that could be used in nuclear weapon development.
Given the historical political instability and the ambiguity and double-talk that generally plagues the relationship and specifically infects treaty talks between the Middle East and the United States and the rest of the world, what is the likelihood a successful, binding treaty could be implemented to control arms proliferation in the Middle East?
It is not likely a binding non-proliferation treaty affecting the Middle East will be signed in the near future. However, there is hope for the future. As noted in the background material, Middle East armed forces remain a source of grea...