, 1982, p. 9), holding that the Soviets would be less a threat if they could somehow be integrated into a global system of great powers. Other factors at work included a desire to minimize U.S. wartime casualties, a policy that maximized reliance on the continued performance of the Red Army.
After the end of the war, the fate and form of containment strategy continued to be shaped by a broad range of consideration, and these considerations, and their resulting dynamics, are a major theme in Gaddis' work. We learn, for example, that the decision of the Truman Administration to rearm on a large scale in 1950 was driven primarily not by the Pentagon, but by liberal Keynesian economists within the administration, who looked upon military expenditures largely as an instrument of fiscal policy (Gaddis, 1982, 93). As a sort of riposte, the "New Look" policy of the Eisenhower administration was encouraged in part by Eisenhower's skepticism about the social effects of what he famously dubbed the military-indu
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