tic appreciation of American long term strategic
interests. He pointed out that the Anglo-Saxon democracies were
prone to moralistic passions. He likened an aroused democracy in
wartime to "those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as
this room and a brain the size of a pin."3 He was particularly
critical of Woodorw Wilson's overstated war aims in 1917-1918, a
"war to make the world safe for democracy." He placed upon
Wilson a large share of the blame for the failure of the Allies
to achieve a peace "with a minimum prejudice to the stability of
the [European] Continent,"4 which he believed stemmed from
Wilson's misguided faith in the efficacy of moral suasion and
Kissinger "emphasized the importance of 'furthering
America's interests in a world where power remains the
ultimate arbiter.'"5 He opposed the efforts of President
Nixon's UN Ambassadors to expand the peacekeeping role of the
United Nations which Kissinger viewed as a useful adjunct to
American foreign policy but not as a substitute for a cold-
blooded assessment of American geopolitical interests. Isaacson
comments that "Kissinger's realpolitik was ill-suited to an open
and democratic society, where it is difficult to invoke distant
ends to justify unpalatable means."6
Although their actions often have belied their rhetoric,
all American presidents since Wilson, especially Democratic ones,
have tended to stress the moral foundations of American foreign
policy, such as the promotion of freedom and democracy abroad
and the protection of human rights as well as their support for
the United Nations as an important guarantor of world peace and
stability. As Wilson put it, "America is the only idealistic
nation in the world."7 Isaacson explains this phenomenon as
...