had moved the trial from a predominantly urban county to a predominantly suburban county, where attitudes about the police differ dramatically.
But is this simply a case of a suburban jury, comprised of 11 whites (including one Latino) and 1 Asian, siding with white police officers over an African-American man? Not so fast. Regardless of the racial and ethnic makeup of the jury, the prosecution still could have won the case, at least against officers Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, if not for several serious blunders.
They first blundered by letting several jurors with ties to law enforcement sit on the jury (Weinstein, 1993). Such a decision reflected a hubris that proved to be the prosecutionÆs undoing. The District AttorneyÆs office seemed to believe that the video tape alone could convict the defendants, no matter the biases of the jury.
Their decisions throughout the trial reflected that view. The prosecutors presented an underwhelming case in chief, to say the least. Their case consisted of the video, testimony from two California Highway Patrol officers who were present at the beating, some inflammatory comments and messages by Powell, and limited medical evidence from the doctors who had treated King (Cohen, 1992). The two prosecutors presented the evidence in a matter of fact monotone, displaying little emotion.
The stateÆs case had several glaring omissions. Most notably: They did not put King on the stand, nor did they call an expert in the use of force to explain exactly what the four officers had done wrong. Both decisions would prove crucial to the defenseÆs case. In addition, the prosecution offered little evidence against the other two officers, Theodore Briseno and Timothy Wind, and made no effort to connect with the jury at an emotional level. They left a hole big enough to drive a truck through, and that is exactly what the defense did.
The defense strategy had three objectives: F...