, had been firmly suppressed; by December of 1982, a period of sometimes-violent internal turmoil "ended with the elimination of all organized opposition to theocracy except in Kurdestan." In 1982-1983, Khomeini was increasingly associated in official statements with the Madhi, a central mystical figure of Shia tradition. The last elements and supporters of secularism had been removed from government, and the triumph of Khomeini-centered theocracy was complete.
The remainder of this study will be an examination of the forces and strategies which led to the predominance of Khomeinism, first over the regime of the Shah, and then over its leftist former allies. We will not attempt here to give a chronological account of the development of the revolution; nor will we, in the confined space available, inquire deeply into the tactical aspects of the revolution, though we may note the effective use of advanced consumer technology, for example audio tapes, as a medium for spreading revolutionary propaganda. Our concern here is rather with the underlying social conditions in Iran that gave rise to the revolution, and with the essential components of the strategy which made Khomeinism the successful contender for the support of the most dynamic segments of Iranian society. It was this broad strategic effectiveness, more than any tactical factors, that led Iran in the course of five years from monarchy to theocratic Islamic republic. Our particular concern will be with the role of the bazaar and the lower middle class in shaping the Iranian revolution.
The Islamic revolution in Iran is a remarkable development on several levels. Its theocratic element we have already taken note of. This characteristic may be regarded as nearly peculiar to Iran, or at least to Shi'ism; Sunni Islam, the majority sect in most of the Islamic world, has a very much less organized or centralized clerical structure. Yet even in the context of Shi'ism, ...