Presidantial/Congressional Distribution of Power

Although Mark Peterson makes a strong case for an equitable distribution of power between the presidency and Congress in his book Legislating Together, it appears that such coalitions work in the majority of presidential terms, but not all. The author examines the politics of domestic policy during the administration of seven presidents, from Eisenhower to Reagan. Peterson concludes that the notion of the president as chief legislator is a myth. In reviewing Peterson's book, however, too many exceptions to his thesis exist to support a blanket acceptance of his contention that presidents and Congresses legislate together.

Peterson does an excellent job of presenting the complexity of the legislative process. A variety of forces go into the shaping of a final legislative bill. Many assume that legislation is passed using what Peterson refers to as the strategic accommodation scenario. Under this scenario, presidents and their aides alter policy initiatives using strategic information gained through consultation with Congress in hopes of attaining favorable Congressional support of the initiatives. Peterson contends that the policymaking process actually operates under the fixed position and uncertainty scenario, " . . . the complexity of goals and the potential lack and distortion of information in the complicated world of legislative policy-making attenuate the significance of congressional input in presidential initiatives" (34).

intact once a consensus is formed. Consensus is often reached when the opposition is unorganized or attenuated. Consensus can also be reached when disagreement over the bill is minimal. Peterson readily admits that two presidents, Johnson and Carter, are anomalies to his thesis of tandem decisionmaking between the Congressional and presidential branches of government. The consultational styles of these two presidents exhibit wide variance. Johnson was masterful in his ability to manipulate Congress. Conversely, Carter, during the first half of his administration, admitted a distaste for Washington politics. Johnson, having been a longtime member of Congress, thoroughly understood the operations of this branch of government. He was the most consultative president in modern history: "Johnson and his people were talking to members of Congress and important staff people all the time, constantly cultivating and fertilizing the legislative domain" (68). Johnson's preferred technique was to telephone members of Congress, particularly those who were strategic in passing his legislative agenda. Johnson would also test the reactions of members by providing them with rough outlines of proposals. Johnson had strong convictions

Category: Government - P