This question addresses the statement that "nations locked in endless wars fight not so much in the hope of victory but to avoid the consequences û especially the domestic consequences û of defeat." The veracity of this statement will be analyzed with reference to three wars: the Napoleonic Wars after 1812, Germany after the battle of Stalingrad, and the United States in Vietnam after 1968. These examples will show the varying degrees of truth of this statement.
The Napoleonic Wars were a direct outcome of the French Revolution and, according to at least one historian, the culmination of one hundred years of war between France and Great Britain (Weigley, 1991, p. 538). They really began in 1792, before Napoleon assumed power in France, and they continued largely as a result of Napoleon's desire to acquire for France undisputed hegemony over Europe. Although he briefly achieved his goal at various points during the wars, Napoleon was ultimately unable to secure French hegemony. Indeed, he ultimately caused all of the other great powers in Europe to ally themselves against France, which eventually led to defeat (Weigley, 1991, pp. 538-540).
After the disastrous Russian campaign in 1812, in which the French forces lost more than 90% of their effective strength, Napoleon permanently lost Prussia and Austria as allies. Both countries had alternatively fought with and against France, but both had also regarded Napoleon with distrust, fearful of French control over the continent. In the spring of 1813, France was alone in Europe. While much of the continent was still under French control, the French army did not have the strength to deny this territory to its enemies (Weigley, 1991, pp. 440-456).
However, the basis of Napoleon's strategy was not the control of geographic territory, but the acquisition of power in Europe. To this end, Napoleon sought to decisively defeat his enemies through major battles. His strategy fell...