le launch sites controlled by the United States in Turkey (Kennedy, 1971, 112). On October 14, 1962, American U2 spy planes flying over Cuba discovered these sights. Alerted immediately, President Kennedy convened an emergency meeting of his top advisors, military leaders, and intelligence officers. At the initial meeting, Kennedy and his advisors ruled out the option of doing nothing (allowing work to continue on the launch sights unchallenged) and agreed that some form of action must be taken to oppose this unprecedented threat. Kennedy commissioned his advisers to meet separately to develop various options for dealing with the missile crisis.
Two options emerged almost immediately as the most viable means of responding to the Soviet Union's provocation. The first option was a military air strike, labeled a "Surgical Strike" by the Pentagon, which would probably need to be followed up by a massive invasion of Cuba (Kennedy, 1971, 12). This option was heavily supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and after news of the Missile Crisis became public, by a powerful Senator, J. William Fulbright (Arkansas) (Kennedy, 1971, 3). Supporters of the military attack option argued that other choices (such as the blockade) would not force the Soviet Union and Cuba to remove the missiles. They fretted that while US navy ships floated harmlessly around Cuba, the missile sights would become fully operational. In their minds, a blockade placed around Cuban waters after the missiles were already operational was a little like, "closing the door after the horse had left the barn" (Kennedy, 1971, 12).
Finally, the military brass argued that a blockade would only encourage the Soviet Union to retaliate with a blockade of their own around Berlin. The generals warned that a blockade around Berlin would simply drag the conflict out longer and weaken America's bargaining position, especially if the Soviet Union demanded the removal of American...