Neoliberal Institutionalism

The neorealist-neoliberal institutionalism debate develops along a number of criticisms, primary among which is the realist or neorealist assertion that international institutions play a minimal role in shaping international politics and that the prospects for cooperation in anarchy are bleak. Neoliberal institutionalism questions these claims, challenging the logical coherence of the neorealist argument and arguing that the explanatory power of neorealism is weak because it fails to move beyond an emphasis on the primacy of states as key actors in international relations.

In this general background, the purpose of the present report is to consider the strengths and weaknesses of neoliberal institutionalism. The prisoner's dilemma is significant in this discussion in that it holds that each player gains when both cooperate, but if only one cooperates, the player who defects gains more. Robert O. Keohane argues instead that a mutually cooperative outcome can occur in equilibrium in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma if the actors do not discount the future too much.

The fundamental difference between realists and neoliberal institutionalists is that neoliberal institutionalists see cooperation as essential in a world of economic interdependence and the belief that shared economic interests create a demand for international institutions and rules. Realists, in contrast, emphasize t

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s a unique opportunity to recognize that the diffusion of power which has occurred has not undermined the ability of any one state or any institution to create order. Neoliberal institutionalism also makes it possible to restructure our understanding of hegemonic cooperation by recognizing that powerful states seek to construct international political economies that suit their interests and their ideologies while recognizing further that a hegemon must be a leader as well as a decisionmaker. Neoliberal institutionalism further recognizes that hegemonic actors must "search for mutual interests with their partners" and must "make some adjustments themselves in addition to demanding that others conform to their design." Nothing in neoliberal institutionalism rejects the realist assertion of the importance of hegemony in terms of bringing about international cooperation. At the same time, hegemonic cooperation bolsters the institutionalist claim that international institutions help to realize common interest in world politics. The fifth strength of neoliberal institutionalism is that it provides for the development of a typology of cooperation problems, including coincidence, coercion, and co-adjustment. Lisa Martin arg
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Approximate Word count = 2005
Approximate Pages = 8 (250 words per page)

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