a dozen or two in the next few decades, through the peaceful or violent partition of several multinational countries, the very inequality of power among states would prevent too great a degree of disorder. The breakup of nineteenth and twentieth century empires produced almost two hundred states·well short of the "300 independent political units that existed in early-modern Germany, or the 500 that Charles Tilly has identified in the Europe of 1500. If the world survived the rapid expansion of the number of U.N. member states from 52 in 1946 to 183 today, surely it can survive a more incremental expansion by a dozen or two more."
Opponents of secessionist nationalism argue that larger minorities, once they gain independence, may in turn oppress smaller minorities in the new national territory. As an example the Quebecois, if independent, might be more inclined to oppress Aboriginal peoples in Quebec. Without condoning any injustice, the fact that a secessionist nation engages in oppressive behavior does not mean its complaints about its own oppression at the hands of a central government or dominant imperial ethnic group are not legitimate. Even criminals may be victims of crime. Inevitably, the replacement of a multinational empire or federation by a group of nation states will leave minorities that are too small or too dispersed without states of their own. This, in itself, is no argument for holding the multinational structure together, unless the multinational elite is significantly more virtuous than the successor national elites, which is rarely the case.
As long as states are willing to cooperate in security alliances and engage in mutually beneficial trade, there is no reason why a small state like Portugal or Croatia should not be as viable as a great power like the United States. Indeed, smaller states may have advantages over the larger states within the context of economic progress "(contrast Singapore a...