Since the close of the Vietnam War, the ideas of the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz have come to thoroughly permeate American military writing. The U.S. Marine Corps's philosophical field manual FMFM-1 "Warfighting," is essentially a distillation of Clausewitz' great classic, "On
War," which has been the bible of many soldiers since Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke attributed its guidance to his victories in the wars of German unification. American soldiers and military thinkers have been attracted by his ideas; George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower were extremely interested in his thoughts (Bassford, 1994, 7).
The acceptability of Clausewitz in the wake of Vietnam is not difficult to account for; among the major military theorists only Clausewitz seriously dealt with the sort of dilemma that the American military faced in the aftermath of defeat. Clausewitz's analysis could not have been more relevant:
"The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character"
Carl von Clausewitz was a complicated man both of action and of thought, who left a legacy not easy to describe. Sensitive, shy, and bookish, he was passionate in his politics and his love for his wife; in combat, he regularly displayed coolness and physical courage. He was ruthless in his examination of any idea, including his own. Such characteristics may account for the fact that, while he rose to high rank in the Prussian service, he served almos...